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† Doctor Simon Duke has passed away on the 5 September 2018. Despite the circumstances, he 
has enthusiastically accepted to contribute to this commemorative issue, for which the Natio-
nal Defence Institute expresses its deepest appreciation and extends the most sincere condolen-
ces to his family and friends.
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Abstract
The articles analyses the process of institutionaliza-
tion of European defence, emphasizing the civilian 
focus of the EU crisis management system, comple-
mented by synergies between civilian and military 
instruments. This shapes current European secu-
rity governance and will influence the future of 
defence architecture. At this level, matters of coher-
ence and effectiveness claim institutional over-
sight, within the Union and regarding relations 
between the EU and NATO, where little architec-
tural overlap occurs. The author acknowledges that 
new defence cooperation initiatives, despite the 
fact they have not so far altered the EU’s institu-
tional architecture, they will influence the relations 
within and between European institutions, with 
various decision making formats, for instance 
regarding PESCO projects. It discusses how PESCO 
may press for a more consistent behaviour by 
Member States, between political agreement for 
external action and participation and how Euro-
pean defence cooperation will have to coexist with 
transatlantic responsibilities of EU/NATO Mem-
ber States. European defence cooperation has not 
added new competences to EU institutions, but the 
availability of new sources of funding may activate 
dormant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and pro-
vide the incentive for Member States to engage 
more systematically in CFSP and CSDP.
Resumo
A Arquitetura de Defesa Europeia: Desenvolvimen-
tos Institucionais
O artigo analisa o processo de institucionalização da 
defesa europeia enfatizando a componente civil do sis-
tema de gestão de crises da União Europeia, complemen-
tado por sinergias geradas entre instrumentos civis e 
militares. Esta circunstância molda o atual sistema de 
governação europeu e influenciará o futuro da arquite-
tura de defesa europeia. A este nível, questões de coerên-
cia e eficácia requerem uma supervisão institucional, 
dentro da União e entre esta e a NATO, plano no qual se 
verifica uma limitada sobreposição institucional. O 
autor constata que as iniciativas recentes no domínio da 
defesa, pese embora não tenham até à data alterado a 
arquitetura institucional da UE, poderão no futuro 
influenciar as relações dentro e entre instituições euro-
peias, nomeadamente através dos projetos no quadro da 
Cooperação Estruturada Permanente. Estes poderão 
gerar um comportamento mais consistente entre acordo 
político e participação efetiva, por parte dos Estados 
Membros, sem esquecer que a defesa europeia terá que 
coexistir com as responsabilidades dos Estados Euro-
peus, que são também membros da NATO. A cooperação 
no domínio da defesa europeia não veio acrescentar 
novas competências às instituições europeias, mas a dis-
ponibilidade de novos recursos financeiros poderá vir a 
ativar disposições do Tratado de Lisboa e facultar o 
incentivo para um envolvimento mais sistemático no 
desenvolvimento da PESC e da PCSD.
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Approaches to Security Architecture
The idea of the European Union’s (EU) security ‘architecture’ has been used in at 
least two different ways. It is, in the first instance, the collection of rules, norms and 
principles that shape the parameters of the EU’s (and others) actions within the 
broad remit of security. The second, which is the focus of this contribution, refers 
more specifically to the procedures and institutions that shape decisions and actions 
within the EU and between the Union and its members. 
It is important to note the relation between these two types of architecture at the 
outset since the former plays an instrumental role in shaping the latter. Take as an 
example the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in eastern 
Ukraine which violated one of the fundamental pillars of the European security 
architecture in the form of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the inviolability of 
borders. This, in turn, has shaped EU-Russia relations and has led to institutional 
adaptations such as the creation of the East StratCom Task Force in 2015 to address 
Russian disinformation campaigns accompanied Russia’s relations with its neigh-
bours. Another example would be the identification of various forms of cyber 
aggression or crime as a security challenge to the EU and its members, which led to 
the adoption of a policy and, more recently, the creation of an EU Agency for 
Network and Information Security (ENISA) in Estonia. This is still in its early stages 
and further institutionalisation within the EU and its members can be anticipated. 
The second main terminological issue to be considered is that, in stricto sensu, the 
EU is not involved in defence unless the particular case of civil protection against 
manmade and natural disasters is included. It is, instead, involved in a wide range 
of security roles, ranging from the more familiar crisis management (civilian and 
military) to a wide range of pre and post-conflict stabilisation roles such as security 
sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation. The point here is 
not to engage in unnecessarily semantic debate, but merely to note that the type of 
security under discussion will trigger a different set of actors and this ‘architecture’. 
This explains why the security architecture of the EU is often referred to as a system 
of networked governance (Faleg, 2017, pp. 65-76). The key notion behind networked 
governance is that actors (institutions) interact with each other in order to produce 
a public purpose (security in this case), often in a hierarchical manner (Fenwick et 
al., 2014, p. 4). 
If we apply this to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) there is a 
broad fit since decision-making is characterised by networked governance. There 
are, however, elements of the institutional architecture that are more formal and 
hierarchical that do not fit the model so well, as in the formal decision-making 
structures (like the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee or 
the role of the European Parliament when it comes to budgetary scrutiny). But, 
networked governance tends to come more to the fore at the implementation level 
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following the main political decisions. This is where the ad hoc architecture, whose 
composition may be crisis specific, will come into play (like the Crisis Platform, EU 
Situation Room and the Crisis Management Board). It is therefore also helpful to 
think in terms of parts of the architecture with formal roles and those whose roles 
are still important, but less formal in the sense that they are responsible for coordi-
nation of the networks involved. It is also worth noting that the dramatis personae 
may well change at different stages of the crisis cycle.
Much of the EU’s security architecture is specific to the Union itself and therefore 
requires effort to understand. Jozef Bátora (2013, pp. 598-613) usefully reminds of 
the interstitial nature of the European External Action Service (EEAS), within which 
much of the crisis management architecture is to be found. Bátora observed that the 
EEAS has emerged in interstices between organizational fields which, in the case of 
the EEAS, has produced something that has some of the attributes of a foreign 
ministry as well as those of a defence ministry. Although national foreign minis-
tries, like the Netherlands, are beginning to become more interstitial, by combining 
foreign policy and development, none have the architectural form of the EEAS. 
This serves as a simple reminder that the demands made of the EU often leads to 
unique architectural forms that are pragmatic but also designed to avoid replicating 
(or clashing with) national architecture. 
The architectural metaphor is also found at the European level of security, often 
reflected in relations between the EU and NATO. Stéphanie Hofmann (2011, pp. 
101-120) was one of the earlier scholars to start considering the impact of institu-
tional overlap, both between organizations but also within them. The idea that 
institutional overlap can shape strategies and influence the development of institu-
tions is more convincing in the CSDP context, most notably in the emergence of 
bodies like the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), when expe-
rience showed that crisis management operations often have closely linked civilian 
and military dimensions and that the overall desire for coherence and effectiveness 
demanded some form of institutional oversight. But, the limitations of institutional 
overlap have also been displayed in the case of EU-NATO relations, notwith-
standing the common membership of 22 states. Beyond the formal exchanges at 
military and civilian levels between the EU and NATO, there are surprisingly few 
examples of institutions or bodies that can be directly attributable to architectural 
overlap. This is largely due to the dissimilarities rather than similarities between 
the organizations and the fact that the EU’s security remit covers far more aspects 
of the crisis cycle than NATO. 
The architecture of CSDP has evolved over almost one and a half decades, to the 
point where it is reasonably mature. It is also worth acknowledging that over this 
period the development of aspects of the architecture have been inhibited by 
national objections. An obvious example was the 2003 call by Belgium, France, 
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Germany and Luxembourg to establish an EU military command headquarters at 
Tervuren, near Brussels. A number of ‘Atlanticist’ countries, notably the United 
Kingdom, saw this as not only duplicating NATO assets but endangering the role 
of NATO as the cornerstone of European security. The U.S., still furious at French 
and Germany refusal to join the allied coalition in Iraq, dismissed the ‘chocolate 
summit’, in a derogatory reference to the four countries. The idea did not die and 
was revived in the aftermath of the June 2016 British ‘Brexit’ referendum. It was 
quietly agreed in Bratislava at a summit, minus the United Kingdom, to create a 
Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (this time with quiet U.S. 
support). 
The establishment of the MPCC was seen as a “very important operational 
decision to strengthen European defence” by the High Representative, Federica 
Mogherini (Council of the EU, 2017a). The MPCC has however only assumed 
command of non-executive missions (such as the training missions in the Central 
African Republic, Mali and Somalia) and works under the political control and 
strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The MPCC was 
formally established in June 2017 and it complements its civilian counterpart, the 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a Joint Support Coor-
dination Cell of civilian and military experts to share expertise and support 
civilian-military cooperation. 
The MPCC is, so far, the only new body to emerge out of the EU Global Strategy 
and the resultant Implementing Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) which was 
presented by the High Representative to the Council in November 2016 as part of 
the EU’s ‘new level of ambition’ in security and defence. Other aspects of the plan 
are likely to result in the need for adaptation to existing parts of the EU’s defence 
architecture. For instance, the trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD), which reports in November 2018, will enable greater trans- 
parency of defence plans between the EU’s members. This, in turn, will have an 
impact on the Capability Development Plan, and the work of the European Defence 
Agency.
 
Brave New Europe – and PESCO
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is core to the strategic future of the 
Union, as outlined in the Global Strategy: “... investment in security and defence is a 
matter of urgency. Full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to 
external crises, build our partners’ capacities, and to guarantee Europe’s safety” 
(EU Global Strategy 2016, pp. 10-11). The strategy also stated that, “an appropriate 
level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to 
promote peace and security within and beyond its borders” (EU Global Strategy 
2016, p. 9). Although it was acknowledged that NATO remains the ‘primary frame-
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work’ for the defence of most EU members, subsequent doubts about U.S. security 
guarantees to its European allies, as well as substantial policy differences, have 
given substance to the idea of strategic autonomy. It has also put PESCO at the 
centre of the Union’s efforts to address its well-known collective defence shortcom-
ings and thus credibility on the international stage.
PESCO is covered in more detail in another contribution (Nunes, 2018, pp. 48-75). 
From an institutional standpoint it does not change the institutional architecture as 
such, but it will nevertheless influence relations within and between institutions 
involved. Twenty-five EU members have entered into PESCO under which legal 
commitments have been made to “join forces on a regular basis, to do things 
together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together” (Mogherini, 
2017). This has resulted in 17 initial projects. The management of the overall process 
and the projects has necessitated a number of institutional adaptations. 
The Council-level (at 25) meet in a ‘PESCO format’ and is responsible for the overall 
policy direction and decision-making pertaining to PESCO, while the projects are 
managed by the contributing Member States. PESCO issues will be addressed at 
the joint Foreign Affairs Council/Defence meeting, usually held twice per annum. 
Voting rights are however confined to those participating in PESCO (that is, all 
except Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom). The ‘PESCO format’ (i.e. all EU 
members are present but voting rights accorded only to PESCO participants) is 
carried through the Council preparatory bodies (the PSC, the Politico-Military 
Working Group, the EU Military Committee). Importantly, however, the scope of 
cooperation for any given project is agreed upon by the Member States themselves, 
but with a common set of governance rules. Provision is also made for the suspen-
sion of a member state who no longer fulfils the criteria by qualified majority vote 
(this also applies to the decision to admit a new member state into PESCO, but 
otherwise unanimity applies).
The Council and the Member States participating in the projects are supported by a 
PESCO Secretariat, consisting of representatives from the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) and the EEAS (the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
and the Military Staff). Based upon the assumption that the collective capabilities of 
the EU members constitute a single set of forces, it is unclear whether the existing 
PESCO projects will result in a lead-nation approach or whether the capabilities 
will in effect be co-owned. Even if the former, PESCO holds the potential for 
common command, logistics, maintenance and training facilities. These could also 
be offered by PESCO contributors as a common facility. The aim is not to create the 
mythological ‘European army’ but to create “a coherent full spectrum force package, 
which could accelerate the provision of forces” (Council, 2018). 
The EDA has a core oversight and implementation role to play in PESCO. Com- 
parisons have usefully been drawn between the design of CSDP and that of the 
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Eurozone and, more recently, with that of the emerging European Defence Union 
and that of Economic and Monetary Union. In this context the EDA plays a compar-
ative role to the European Central Bank. The EDA assists the High Representative 
in the assessment of PESCO commitments, with the Agency responsible for the 
capability development aspects. If the EDA is the preferred joint capability facili-
tator, the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d’Armement (OCCAR) 
is seen as the preferred collaborative programme managing organisation (Council 
2017b, Annex II, p. 18). The EDA, OCCAR and the European Air Transport 
Command (EATC), signed a Letter of Intent on 25 January 2018, building on a July 
2012 administrative agreement, to cooperate more closely and avoid duplication of 
effort (EDA-OCCAR, 2012). The precise modalities of how EDA-OCCAR coopera-
tion will work will become apparent, but the expertise of the latter in the coordina-
tion and management of complex programmes at the advanced stage could 
complement the Agency. It remains to be seen how, in this and other cases, ‘Brexit’ 
will complicate relations with the UK as a founder member of OCCAR but outside 
the EDA and thus access to EDF funding from March 2019 onwards, unless an 
agreement can be made. 
PESCO is closely related to CARD, mentioned above, and to the European Defence 
Fund (EDF), established in June 2017. The fund is designed to promote cooperation 
and cost savings among EU Member States through co-financing with the EU 
budget of the joint development of defence equipment and technology. The research 
and development strands of the budget, alongside the Member States’ contribu-
tions, could represent an investment in defence research and capability develop-
ment of €5.5 billion after 2020 (European Commission, 2017a). The extreme costs of 
developing major defence platforms on a purely national basis, even for the largest 
EU members, has underlined the economic rationale behind joint development and 
ownership of the type pioneered by the seven-nation European Air Transport 
Command (EATC) at Eindhoven. Any such future multinational platforms will call 
for similar EATC type decision-making, advisory and budget structures alongside 
common training. This will also call for close coordination with the key EU bodies. 
The Winter Package and the Broader Implications for Defence Architecture
The initiatives discussed above formed part of a ‘Winter package’ of initiatives 
presented to the Council in late 2016. It is too soon to state with any certainty what 
the precise impact on the EU’s defence architecture will be, but four potential impli-
cations are discernible. 
First, CSDP has been beset by the problem of EU members who vote in favour of a 
CSDP mission or operation, and thus give their political assent, but then decline to 
actually participate. This is merely a reflection of the fact that the EU remains 
heavily reliant upon its members for its ability to act in civilian and military crisis 
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management. It is also worth noting that the intended deployment of military force 
requires a unanimous decision, thus making it all the more difficult for a country 
that has no intention of participating to decline to support the political decision. 
The logic of PESCO challenges this practice since the co-development of platforms 
and systems will tend to imply that decisions on capabilities will be made in groups, 
although legally it leaves national sovereignty untouched.
Second, PESCO may well imply that military operations, in particular, will be 
launched in the EU framework and not outside it. The tendency to launch opera-
tions outside the EU and NATO (as in 2011 in Libya) has been a growing tendency, 
encouraged in part by the U.S. preference to work with coalitions of the willing. 
CARD and PESCO will make this more difficult, but not impossible, due to the 
common assessment of challenges and strategic interests facilitated by the former 
and the binding nature of the latter. The links between CARD and PESCO are, 
however, mainly implicit rather than explicit. Nor was the connection between the 
EDF and PESCO explicit until the Commission established a link in June 2017 
whereby all prototypes produced in the context of PESCO-related projects which 
are eligible for EDF funding, will have a 10% increase in contributions from the 
European budget (from 20% to 30%) (Mauro and Santopinto, 2017, p. 30). 
Third, the impact of the winter package on relations with NATO is not entirely 
clear. On paper, anything that makes the common membership of the EU and 
NATO more capable and efficient is good for both organisations. But, it remains to 
be seen exactly what kind of ‘strategic autonomy’ the EU has in mind, especially as 
political differences between Washington, Brussels and the national capitals 
multiply. There is the risk of drift and in order to mitigate this links will have to be 
made at multiple levels: between the EU-NATO and the capitals as they draw up 
their National Implementation Plans for PESCO; between the EU and NATO’s 
Defence Planning Process (NDDP); and at the strategic level on how the 2% NATO 
commitments apply to the common membership of the organisations. The High 
Representative has insisted that “the 2% debate on defence spending is a NATO 
debate and it is for the Member States or allies in NATO to define their way” 
(Mogherini, 2018). She is correct technically, but the 2014 NATO Wales summit also 
included the commitment to spend 20% of their annual defence spending on “major 
new equipment, including related research and development” (NATO, 2014). That 
is far from just a NATO matter since it has a direct bearing on PESCO. Coordination 
is evidently called for.
Fourth, if ‘architecture’ can be stretched to embrace the relevant external financial 
instruments, it is evident that the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
will radically reduce the current external financial instruments (EFIs). The conclu-
sion of the mid-term reviews for the current MFF indicate a number of short- 
comings with the current EFIs, including difficulties in ‘joined-up approaches’, 
European Defence Architecture: Institutional Developments
Nação e Defesa 30
gaps in coverage (notably with the Union’s ability to promote and mainstream 
‘values’ agendas) and a lack of instruments that can react in a timely manner to new 
developments (European Commission, 2017b). Discussions on the reform of the 
MFF are underway but it is already evident that streamlining and simplification of 
the EFIs is gaining momentum, with the possible implication that more funding for 
security-related rapid response mechanisms could fall under a non-programmable 
rapid response envelope. Presumably, other longer-term and broader aspects of 
security will fall under some type of thematic instrument which follows the EU 
Global Strategy priorities (‘resilience’ will be of particular importance) or geogra- 
phically oriented partner instruments. 
More specifically, the European Council announced in June 2017 that the Athena 
mechanism, which covers some common costs of CSDP operations, will be 
expanded to include the common costs of the deployment and redeployment of the 
EU Battlegroups. At the moment the mechanism covers around 10-15% of the 
common costs, while the suggested revisions could increase them to around 20%. 
Although worthwhile, this will not alter the general picture where CSDP opera-
tions remain dependent upon Member States munificence. It is also worth noting 
that there are few incentives for third parties to participate since their access to 
PESCO, the EDF or the revised Athena mechanism is not currently foreseen but 
cannot be discounted in the longer-term.
Conclusions
Defence architecture is, admittedly, not always the most stimulating aspect of the 
EU’s rapidly developing security and defence. It is, nevertheless, essential for the 
grounding and workings of the ‘Winter package’ discussed above. The emphasis 
will be upon adaptations to existing structures rather than the creation of new insti-
tutions or bodies. Indeed, it could be argued that the main thrust of the ‘Winter 
package’ was to imbue life into features of the Lisbon Treaty that had lain moribund 
for almost a decade. 
In spite of the EU’s new ‘level of ambition’ it is significant that no new powers have 
been attributed to any EU institution or agency, most notably the EDA, since CFSP 
and CSDP retain their unambiguous intergovernmental character. If we look for 
game changers in terms of the willingness of Member States to actually physically 
contribute to CSDP operations, it is most likely to lie in ability of the EDF to leverage 
national defence funding for the development of joint research and development 
and eventually common platforms. The amounts on offer may be relatively modest, 
especially in a defence market that is largely driven by exports, but they cannot be 
dismissed as trivial either. Institutions rarely solve problems, but they can certainly 
foster change.
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